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Introduction 
Model checking [1] is a well-known method to verify 
a formal model in all possible configurations. 
Nevertheless this technique can hardly scale up to 
industrial asynchronous systems because of the 
state-space explosion problem [17]. 
To address this challenge, a new approach based 
on context specification (the environment of the 
system) and an observation engine called OBP 
(Observer Based Prover) has been developed [2]. 
The idea is that given a property to be verified, one 
doesn’t need to explore all possible configurations of 
the complete system. Among all possible behavior 
of the system, a tiny part is representative enough 
for the property to be verified. 
Thus, specifying a pertinent environment (a context) 
allows restricting the system behavior on those 
only parts where the property is worth verifying. 
 
The objective of our work is to apply this Context-
aware verification method to the verification of 
SCADE [3, 10] systems designed in LUSTRE 
language, in order to check behavioral properties 
related to system safety. 
Moreover LUSTRE [4, 9] is a synchronous 
language whereas OBP exploration engine takes as 
input an asynchronous model designed in FIACRE 
[5] language. 
To cope with this problem our approach consists in 
developing a GALS method combining 
asynchronous contexts with synchronous models [6, 
7, 8]. 
The interest of our new approach is twofold: 
 Verifying formal properties on synchronous 
industrial systems with formal methods using 
GALS approach, 
 Facing the state-space explosion via context 
aware specification; 
To our knowledge, there’s no work combining those 
two previous methods.  
This document is organized as follows: 
First, a state of art on existing methods combining 
synchronous system modeling within an 
asynchronous environment is presented. 
Next, we expose the GALS methodology approach 
we combined with context aware verification method. 
Then we introduce two case studies used for 
experimentation of our method. 
Eventually we conclude and present some 
perspectives for future work. 
This work is done in the frame of the French R&D 
project DEPARTS 
(1)
, which is a FSN/BGLE project 
supported by BPI France. 
 
1. State of the art 
Mixing synchronous and asynchronous model 
designs. As demonstrated into previous studies (cf. 
Airbus [12], and Rockwell-Collins [13]), using an 
explicit model-checker for synchronous language 
verification may be required to verify some 
asynchronous properties between synchronous 
parts of a system. 
Moreover, traditional “synchronous-observers” 
verification approach is not applicable in that case: 
asynchronous behaviors’ modeling is not possible 
with synchronous language (i.e. communication 
delays, asynchronous clocks between processors). 
 
GALS. Verifying a synchronous system in an 
asynchronous environment is not an easy task 
because of synchronicity assumption: Input/Output 
computations are considered to take no time. 
To cope with this problem several GALS approaches 
have been developed [6, 7, 8]. 
 
                                                          
(1) 
DEsign PAtterns for Real Time and Safe applications. 
FSN - Fonds national pour la Société Numérique. 
BGLE - Briques Génériques du Logiciel Embarqué. 
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In [7], the work consists in generating C code from 
the synchronous language SIGNAL [14]. Then, this 
code is called atomically (to ensure synchronicity 
assumption) in an asynchronous formal language: 
PROMELA [15]. The environment closing the overall 
system is then designed in PROMELA and the 
verification of a property is done with SPIN model 
checker [15]. 
Nevertheless when dealing with huge systems, the 
environment grows drastically generating a state-
space explosion. For this reason, an optimized 
exploration method has been developed based on 
OBP explorer and its associated Context Description 




Context-aware Verification approach. State-space 
explosion is intrinsically related on the way model 
checking method works. Model checking consists in 
closing a formal system with all possible behaviors 
of its environment, and then exhaustively analyzing 
the emerging executions. The idea behind the 
Context-aware Verification methodology [2] is that 
only a subset of the environment is necessary in 
accordance with the property one want to verify. This 
explicit description of the environment has many 
benefits: 
 The environment can be decomposed by 
several contexts focusing on different system 
modes. 
 When the environment is too large, it can be 
decomposed by OBP (splitting method [11]) to 
generate independent sub-contexts, which 
are successively composed with the system and 
the property so that to make several little 
verification. 
 By enforcing some structural properties on the 
environment behaviors, OBP explorer can also 
use optimized algorithms such as PastFree[ze] 
to reduce the verification time [16]. 
 Properties are verified only on specific context 
definitions. 
 
The following picture could summarize the Context-
aware Verification approach, implemented in the 
OBP toolkit. 






In this paper we propose to combine a GALS 
verification methodology with the Context-aware 
Verification approach. Our technique uses the 
synchronous LUSTRE language designed with 
SCADE tool and FIACRE asynchronous language 
used by OBP. We have experimentally validated our 
approach using two realistic case studies from the 
automotive and aero-space domain. In this study we 
focused on the verification of functional properties. 
Nevertheless our approach could integrate other 
classes of properties, and can accommodate 
techniques for guaranteeing the numerical accuracy. 
 
The following picture summarizes our method. 
 
 
Our approach is structured as follows:  
1. We first design the system with SCADE 
components based on LUSTRE language; 
2. Then we generate C code from the LUSTRE 
model thanks to the qualified SCADE code 
generator KCG51; 
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3. Next, from C code we generate the 
corresponding FIACRE model in accordance 
with the synchronicity assumption; 
4. To make possible the compilation of C code, we 
generate some wrappers; the wrapper is useful 
to exchange data between FIACRE model and C 
code called functions; 
5. FIACRE system with C code called function is 
generated so that to make the OBP exploration 
possible; 
Once the FIACRE system is generated, following the 
previous five 5 steps one can implement an 
environment (an OBP context) to verify properties. 
Nevertheless, some stimuli sent from the 
environment needs some parameters values so that 
to make the system under verification evolving. 
To this purpose, we choose to generate a data 
structure into the FIACRE system containing all the 
input and output values which can be exchanged 
with the environment.  
The data structure contained in the FIACRE model 
will be used for verification purpose by OBP tool. 
This implementation is well suited to our 
methodology because SCADE system stores all 
input and output values on global data structure too. 
 
The stimuli and parameters sent by the environment 
are therefore copied into the FIACRE data structure 
(identical to SCADE C code data structure). 
This data structure is passed in C call function 
parameters which are dedicated to the computations 
and modifications of input output values of the 
system. 
When the C call function has ended, the data 
structure which has been modified is copied again 
into the FIACRE data structure so that OBP tool 
could display and verify properties from this FIACRE 
data structure. 
The following picture summarizes the data 
exchanges between the environment, the FIACRE 
system and C call procedures. 
 
 
3. Environment Modeling and Analysis 
3.1 Environment modeling 
In the case of Context-aware Verification, the 
environment modeling should be seen as a 
methodological phase that needs to balance two 
important constraints while building the context. 
First the context has to cover enough behaviors to 
be considered valid for a given property. But at the 
same time it has to be small enough to be possible 
to exhaustively explore the product of its 
composition with the system under study (SUS). 
 
The context is modelled starting from the system 
requirements one want to verify. From the 
requirements analysis, the designer identifies all the 
actors of the system that can interact and send 
some stimuli to the system. 
 
For each actor, its behavior is refined by describing 
possible actions it can send to the system. 
Eventually all the actors behaviors’ are interleaved 
so that to generate all possible scenario of the 
environment.  
 
Of course the more actors the worst, because each 
actor behavior is interleaved with all others 
potentially generating a combinatorial explosion of 
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the environment state space during unfolding and 
interleaving step. 
 
This phase is done manually, and relies on the 
engineering judgment. 
To face this environment state space explosion, a 
pertinent modelling of the environment must be 
described by the engineer who will for instance:  
 discard some actors with no relation to the 
requirements, 
 discard some useless actors stimuli with regard 
to the requirements he wants to verify, 
 create several different environment with relation 
to the set of requirements he wants to verify, 
 create a specific initialization sequence events to 
dig the system in a pertinent state for the 
verification. 
 
3.2 Environment Analysis 
Nevertheless a pertinent environment modeling is 
not always sufficient to face the environment 
combinatorial explosion. 
For this purpose, the context aware verification tool 
(OBP) incorporates some algorithm to reduce 





The splitting method consists in decomposing the 
global context generated by the interleaving of all the 
actors’ events in a set of global “sub-contexts” which 
will be composed with the system under study. 
This method allows verifying systems stimulated by 
a complex environment, and covers exhaustively the 
whole generated state-space. 
 
The combinatorial explosion environment behavior in 
space due to environment is transferred to 
combinatorial explosion in time due to the countless 
“sub-contexts” generated. 
Nevertheless this new combinatorial explosion can 
be faced by parallel verification of the “sub-contexts” 
distributed to a set of machines. 
 
An important observation is that while with the 
automatic-split technique the state-space is 
decomposed in several partitions, these partitions 
are not disjoint. 
Hence the sum of these explorations with splitting 
represents the analysis of nearly two times more 
states and transitions than the exact initial state-
space without splitting. 
Nevertheless, we believe that this is a small price to 
pay for the possibility of analyzing five times larger 
state-space without the need of doubling the 
physical memory of the machine. 
 
4. Case Studies 
4.1 Roll-Control. We have first applied our method 
to a simple case study: a Roll-Control system. 
The Roll-Control system allows to compute the Roll-
Rate value, and to generate roll warnings whenever 
the roll rate is greater than 15° or lower than -15°. 
 
The environment of this system is composed by 
three « actors »: 
 Pilot actions on joystick 
 Left and Right yaw applied on the plane 
As a result of those inputs, the Roll-Rate is updated 
and warnings are activated in case the Roll-Rate is 
out of range. 
 
First, the simplified coupling effect is calculated, 
then, the plane roll rate is calculated as follows: 
rollCoupling = (leftAdvYaw – rightAdvYaw) × 0.1 
rollRate = (joystickCmd – rollCoupling) × 0.25 
The absolute value of the Roll Rate has to be 
saturated to 25.0. 
 
The Roll-Control system is described in the following 
figure 4.1. 
 
The Roll-Control is composed of 2500 lines of C 
code. 
We have successfully checked following property on 
this model with OBP exploration engine: 
The roll-control system shall never raise “left roll 
warning” and “right roll warning” at the same time; 
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This case study has successfully passed verification 
steps, because of its small size and limited possible 
behaviors. 
 
4.2 Cruise-Control system. We then applied our 
method on an automotive Cruise-Control System 
(CCS) designed in SCADE. 
This section provides an overview and some 
requirements of this case study. 
 
Functional Overview. The CCS main function is to 
adjust the speed of a vehicle. 
After powering the system on, the driver first has to 
capture a target speed, and then it is possible to 
engage the system. This target speed can be 
increased or decreased by 5 km/h with the tap of a 
button. 
There are also several important safety features. 
The system shall disengage as soon as the driver 
hits the brake pedal or if the current vehicle speed 
(S) is out of bounds (40 < S < 180 km/h). In such 
case, it shall not engage again until the driver hits a 
"resume" button. If the driver presses the 
accelerator, the system shall pause itself until the 
pedal gets released. 
 
Architecture overview (cf. Figure 4.2). 
The CCS is composed of 3 mains parts: a “control 
panel”, a “system center”, and an “actuation 
manager” (for speed and throttle calculation). 
 
 
The control panel is in charge of converting inputs 
signals from user to provide them to the system. 
The actuation manager is able to capture the 
current speed and, once enabled, to adjust the 
vehicle speed to the defined target speed (and also 
throttle command value). 
The system center component, that acts as a 
controller, and includes a state machine (states 
OFF, STDBY, ON). 
The control panel acquires signals following from 
buttons used by the driver to operate the system: 
 On, Off: Enable or disable the system 
 Set: Capture the current speed as the target 
value 
 Resume: Engage the control speed function 
 Suspend: Disengage the control speed function 
 QuickAccel: Increase the target speed by step 
 QuickDecel: Decrease the target speed by step 
In our case, the “control panel” is also responsible of 
providing BrakePressed and AccelPressed signals, 
which are built with Brake and Accel pedals signals, 
and to compute SpeedOutOfBounds signal. All are 
booleans signals provided to system center, with 
behaviours defined below: 
 Brake pedal pressed: induces disengagement, 
 Speed of the vehicle goes out of bounds: 
induces disengagement, 
 Accelerator pedal pressed or released: pauses 
or resumes the speed control function; 
The actuation module provides means for the 
system to interact with the vehicle. It can capture the 
current speed of the vehicle, and use it as a new 
target speed value. Once the CCS enabled, the 
actuation is responsible for controlling the vehicle 
speed accordingly. 
Finally, the system center is the core of the CCS. It 
is responsible for handling events detected by 
control panel module. 
Then system center use these events to switch to 
right system state, and to engage control function or 
not: 
 From OFF to STD_BY: on btn_On, 
 From STD_BY to ON: on btn_Set, 
 From ON to STD_BY: on btn_Suspend or Brake, 
 From STD_BY to OFF: on btn_Off; 
 
Requirements. This section lists three main 
requirements of the CCS system and shows how to 
model them using the CDL formalism, with 
predicates or observers automatons. 
REQ.1: The system shall not engage itself if the 
target cruise speed is not set. 
REQ.2: The target Speed shall never be lower than 
40 km/h or higher than 180 km/h. 
REQ.3: When the system is powered off, the target 
speed shall be reset, and considered as unset. 
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REQ.1 can be encoded by using an observer 
automaton, on figure 4.3 below. To encode this 
observer using CDL formalism, we first need to 
introduce the events triggering the transitions 
 
 
4.4 predicate pCruiseSpeedIsUnset is { 
 {sys}1:context._Cruise_speed < 40 
 or {sys}1:context._Cruise_speed >180 } 
 event eTargetSpeedUnset is { 
 pCruiseSpeedIsUnset becomes true } 
 
On listing 4.4, pCruiseSpeedIsUnset is a predicate 
on cruise speed value, read from interface structure 
(context) of the main process {sys}, returning true if 
the constraint is verified. 
Then an event eTargetSpeedUnset is built with 
“becomes true” formula in order to express a rising 
edge of the predicate, which is an observable event 
in OBP observation engine. 
On listing 4.5, another event can be defined based 
on system center state machine output value 
(Regul_ON). 
 
4.5 predicate pSystemIsEngaged is { 
 {sys}1:context._Regul_ON = 1 } 
 event eSystemEngaged is { 
 pSystemIsEngaged becomes true } 
 
Using these events, the observer automaton of 
figure is defined in listing 4.6: 
4.6 property REQ1 is { 
 start -- eTargetSpeedUnset  --> wait; 
 wait -- eSystemEngaged  --> reject; 
 wait -- eTargetSpeedSet  --> start } 
 
We can then encode two others requirements 
REQ.2 and REQ.3 using the same principles. 
To model predicates and events, we could also use 
internal states of concurrent processes of the 
system. 
 
Environment. In the case of the CCS the 
environment is built from two main distinct actors 
modeling: 
a) a nominal scenario, 
b) a disruptor; 
The basic scenario can be seen as a linear use case 
of the CCS that covers all the functionality involved 
by the properties we aim to verify. 
This scenario must pass through following steps: 
 
Event Behavior 
Press Accelerate pedal Vehicle speed grows 
Button On CCS ON / stand-by 
Button Set Target speed set 
Stop Accelerate pedal CCS engaged / regulate 
Brake pedal CCS in stand-by 
Resume button CCS engaged 
Button Off CCS OFF 
 
The disruptor is a wide alternative including changes 
of the vehicle speed within the allowed range or not, 
pressure on the pedals and the panel buttons. The 
disruptor stresses the SUS against a number of 
possible unexpected behaviors of the environment.  
 
The disruptor encoding refers to verification 
environment capability of sending events to system, 
including speed target requests, pressure on pedals, 
or on panel buttons. 
 






[] ePushButton_b1/b2/b3 } 
 
Once these two actors are composed 
asynchronously, we get a wide range of variations of 
the basic scenario using the capabilities of the 
disruptor at all stages. 
 
4.8 Cdl myContext is { 
 
Properties req1 
Assert req2, req3 
 Init is { eBtnOn } 
 
Main is { basic_scenario 




 Page 7/8 
4.3 Verification Results 
This section presents the results obtained for the 
verification of the main requirements previously 
presented, emphasizing the importance of the 
Context-aware Verification approach, applied on our 
GALS approach. 
During the exploration, we have tried several kinds 
of observers, and we have intentionally create errors 
into the model in order to check that there were 
detected (assertion, or reject state of automaton). 
The verification results for the CCS case study are: 
 17.847 states and 62.771 transitions (with 3 
processes, in 21 sec); 
 367.800 states and 1.621.000 transitions 
(with 4 processes, in 571 sec) 
So we can conclude that our approach does not 
produce a too large state space, due to 
encapsulation technique used (atomic execution of 
synchronous function into asynchronous process). 
Even if we have not yet modeled all required 
behaviors as asynchronous communication between 
several more synchronous processes, it seems to be 
a very promising approach for larger and complex 
systems. 
As a comparison, our partner from Lab-STICC has 
applied same verification context on an 
asynchronous CCS UML model, which generates 3 
millions of states and 10 millions of transitions (with 
4 processes, and 4 ticks of clock only) (cf. [18]). 
For the moment, we have only used traditional 
Breadth-First Search (BFS) reachability algorithms. 
But we know that in case of a larger state space, we 
could also use PastFree[ze] algorithm and splitting 
technique. 
The use of the PastFree[ze] algorithm enable the 
analysis of a 2.4 times larger state-space, and the 
joint use of PastFree[ze] and automatic split 
technique enable 4.78 times larger state-space, 
compared to traditional Breadth-First Search (BFS) 
reachability algorithms, without the need of 










5. Conclusion and Perspectives 
In this paper we have used the Context-aware 
Verification technique for the analysis of several 
requirements of a Cruise-Control System composed 
of synchronous languages functions. 
Modeling and verification of asynchronous properties 
of this kind of systems based on composition of 
synchronous components, renders traditional 
synchronous model-checking approaches inefficient. 
Using the environment reification through the CDL 
formalism, this task becomes manageable by relying 
on two powerful optimization strategies. 
These strategies rely on the structural properties of 
the CDL contexts and enable the reachability 
analysis of larger industrial models. 
 
While the approach presented in this paper offers 
promising results, for this technique to be used on 
industrial-scale critical systems, some work has to 
be done on the formalization of the context 
coverage, with respect to the full-system behavior, in 
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